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1Abstract
This paper presents a case study of a sample of Mexican agricultural workers in
Southern California based on primary data collected by the authors from rural areas
in and around Bakers¯eld. The ultimate aim of this study is to characterize and
explore more deeply the complex array of variables that enter the migration decision
of a typical worker in this region, and analyze the interrelationships between these
variables. The administered survey was designed to accommodate questions that
attempt to elicit responses about preferences in addition to those with easily quan-
ti¯able answers. This paper presents a descriptive summary of the survey results
followed by the two main empirical questions and the results of the inquiry that
constitute the main innovation of this work: i) to empirically estimate and analyze
a \home premium": the non pecuniary bene¯t of being in Mexico and its possible
determinants and ii) empirically estimate what factors a®ect the willingness to pay
for annual legal visas among the undocumented workers in the region. The sec-
ond question is an interesting and topical one because of the current debate about
a possible temporary guest worker program. However, this paper does not take
a policy perspective to the question but simply attempts to estimate the relative
importance of di®erent sources of the possible bene¯t of legalization to an undoc-
umented worker. The data suggest that a signi¯cant home premium exists that is
not signi¯cantly di®erent between migrants of the two statuses, nor does it dimin-
ish with years spent in the U.S. The analysis of WTP suggests that the perceived
bene¯t of legal status to a migrant comes mainly from a perception of higher wages
in this status and through a perceived reduction in the average unemployment spell
when ¯rst entering the U.S. by becoming legal.
1 Introduction
Undocumented Mexican migration to the U.S. has been a recurrent theme dictating INS
(currently, USCIS) policy. The continuously interactive responses of policy makers in the
U.S. and undocumented workers from Mexico over the last three decades has created a
unique situation that poses various complex and extremely interesting questions. This
has naturally resulted in a signi¯cant bi-national research e®ort between demographic
economists and sociologists on both sides of the border. This study is motivated by
a small but important subset of issues that a®ect the migration decision of a Mexican
worker. The paper proceeds with Section 2 providing a summary of trends in Mexican
immigration to the U.S. which make this migratory °ow uniquely interesting. Section
23 discusses the relevance of this case study to the wider questions and brie°y discusses
the data collected for this work through surveys administered to agricultural workers in
the Bakers¯eld area and also summarizes the interesting results from the survey. Section
4 discusses the relevance of the Willingness to Pay approach in valuing legal visas and
presents the empirical results. Section 5 presents the discussion and empirical analysis of
the \home premium" and Section 6 concludes.
2 Historical, Current and Expected Future Trends in
Mexican Immigration
Historically, the ¯rst notable increase in undocumented migration was caused by the end
of the Bracero Program in 1964. This was a bi-national agreement that instituted a
guest-worker program in 1942, partly in response to labor shortages caused by the Second
World War. This let millions of Mexican workers (largely agricultural) enter the U.S on
temporary legal visas. This program was extended through the 1950's but was unilaterally
terminated by the U.S after successful lobbying e®orts of organized labor in 1964 (Orrenius
2001). As a result, many \Braceros" simply started to migrate illegally, because of the
abrupt change in their status. This phenomenon was facilitated by an important residual
of the Bracero program - the \network e®ects". The program had established vital links
between employers in the U.S., recruiters on both sides of the border and the migrant
workers that lowered the risks of migrating to the U.S. even after the termination of the
program. Studies based on survey data clearly establish the importance of these networks
in increasing the propensity to migrate. (Massey et al. 1987). This has sparked a renewed
interest among both economists and sociologists in the concept of \Social Capital" which
is currently the subject of a signi¯cant body of collaborative research among the two
3disciplines1.
Since the actual number of undocumented entries into the U.S. cannot be directly
measured, these are estimated based on the number of apprehensions at the border by
the INS, after controlling for factors like increased apprehension activity due to additional
funding allocated to the Border Patrol, etc. National surveys in Mexico support the
estimates of Massey and Singer (1995), who report the following general trend: The Gross
in°ow of undocumented migrants grew on average by 20% from 1965 to 1978, when it
reached nearly 1.5 million, levelling o® till Mexico's economic crisis in the early eighties
that prompted another period of rapid expansion, peaking at 3.8 million in 1986. This
number fell into the 2.5 to 3 million range till 1990. Their estimate gives a total of 36.5
million entries by undocumented Mexicans over the period 1965-1990, which they say is
broadly consistent with a recent national survey in Mexico, that reveals that one-third of
all Mexicans have been to the U.S. at some point in their lives 2. What is clear from these
¯gures is that the signi¯cant portion of Mexican migration to the U.S. is temporary and
repetitive in nature. Figure 1 shows estimated gross and net undocumented migration
that illustrates the importance of return migration. Gross migration steadily increases
from the early eighties following the Mexican Crisis and falls substantially following the
passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act in 19863.
Massey and Singer (1995) predict that over the period of 1965 to 1990, 86% of all
illegal entries into the U.S were o®set by departures, which would imply a net in°ow of
only 5.2 million workers over this 25 year period.
1See Taylor (1986), Massey (1990), Davis and Winters (2001), Winters, de Janvry, and
Sadoulet (2001), Curran and Rivero-Fuentes (2003)
2Current Population of Mexico: 99,600,000.
3This decrease is attributed more to the fact that many undocumented workers were legalized and
now crossed the border freely than a more e®ective Border Patrol through increased funding.
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Figure 1: Estimated Gross and Net undocumented in-migration from Mexico
Source: Massey and Singer (1995)
According to the most recent estimates of the Urban Institute in 2004 based on the
Current Population Survey and census data, 27% of the 34.5 million foreign born pop-
ulation living in the United States is currently undocumented (Figure 2 illustrates the
breakdown of the total foreign born population in the U.S.). This puts the undocu-
mented population ¯gure in the United States at approximately 9.3 million. The largest
single contributor to this population is Mexico that accounts for 57% or a total of 5.3
million workers. All other Latin American countries together contribute another 23%
to the total. More than half of the Mexican born population in the United States (9.9
million) is undocumented as compared to the relatively smaller one in six for this average
in the rest of the foreign born population.
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Figure 2: Legal Status
Mexico accounts for about a ¯fth of this population. The most substantial component of
Mexican legal workers derive their status from the Immigration Reform and Control Act
(IRCA)passed in 1986 which gave amnesty to more than 2 million workers, most of whom
were seasonal agricultural laborers.
Even though currently about half of the Mexican population in the U.S. is undocu-
mented, around 80% of newly arrived immigrants are undocumented and this trend seems
more or less stable, unless the U.S. experiences either signi¯cant and sustained deteriora-
tion in the economy or changes in immigration policy. According to the Urban Institute
the U.S. can anticipate 14 million entries between 2000 and 2010 and the net migration
of 400,000 Mexicans per year. This would result in more than 10% of the Mexican born
population living in the U.S. with less than 90% living in Mexico (approximately 9% of
Mexican born population now lives in the U.S.).
626% of the total undocumented population of the U.S. lives in California, more than
twice that of the next largest concentration in Texas. According to the Public Policy In-
stitute of California, through the mid 1980s, net undocumented immigration increased to
reach its peak at more than 200,000 people between April 1989 and April 1990. However,
in the early 1990s, California saw a sharp fall in net undocumented immigration; by the
early 90's the net annual °ow may have declined to fewer than 100,000. According to the
latest Census, more than 2 million undocumented immigrants live in California, which
represents more than 6.5 percent of the state's population.
In summary the factors that make the phenomenon of Mexican migration to the U.S.
unique are i) The size of the Mexican born population in the U.S. compared to that from
other countries and ii) the temporary and repetitive nature of much of this migration. The
second of these factors stresses the ties of this population to the home community main-
tained by an extensive system of economic and social networks spanning both countries.
This paper explores a small subset of these issues through a case study for California, the
largest participant in this migratory phenomenon.
3 Survey Results
The survey covered over 70 undocumented workers and 30 legal workers but the full sample
could not be used for all tests due to missing observations in some of the variables. After
accounting for the missing observations, the minimum sample size used in any test was
no less than 59 for undocumented and 30 for documented workers.
73.1 Survey Methodology
The survey was conducted over a two week period in the towns of Arvin and Lamont on
the outskirts of Bakers¯eld. The city of Arvin, CA with a population of approximately
13,000 is a farming community located approximately 18 miles southeast of Bakers¯eld.
Lamont, CA is also a predominantly farming community, located approximately 10 miles
from Bakers¯eld, with a population of roughly 14,000. Undocumented workers typically
migrate to Lamont and Arvin to work in the grape and carrot ¯elds. In fact, Arvin is
home to one of the world's largest manufacturers of carrots, Grimmway Farms. One can
often ¯nd migrant farm workers resting and relaxing after a full day's work, in many of
the public parks in these cities. Our survey was conducted in these locations over the two
week period.
The sole quali¯er for survey subjects was that they be from Mexico and of majority
age. The typical surveyee was someone randomly approached by the surveyors and asked
to participate. Upon the provision of consent and the con¯rmation of majority age, the
survey4 was administered, either in English or Spanish as needed. The key to participation
by undocumented workers was our assurance of the maintenance of con¯dentiality of the
responses as well as the non-identi¯cation of each surveyee. As such we were able to
survey approximately 100 individuals.
3.2 Years in the U.S. since the First Trip
The sample showed a signi¯cant positive di®erence between the age of the legal and
undocumented workers. In order to explore if this suggested a presence of a longer time
for networking, the di®erence between the age of the migrant and the age when the
4Actual survey provided upon request.
8migrant made his or her ¯rst trip to the U.S. was taken. For this variable as well, we
found a signi¯cant di®erence between these years for legal and illegal workers. The data
are illustrated in Figure 3 which shows that this pro¯le di®ers strikingly between the two
statuses. If a longer time for networking implies a higher probability of acquiring legal
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Figure 3: Years Since First U.S. Trip
status is however not easily deduced from this result. This result is probably more due
to an historical \anomaly", the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) passed in
1986 that gave legal status to more than 2 million workers most of whom were Seasonal
Agricultural Workers (SAWS). Hence more time spent in the U.S. since the ¯rst trip is
probably directly related to the chances of the migrant having acquired this status under
the IRCA.
Another interesting ¯nding was that even though the number of trips back home
since the ¯rst was signi¯cantly higher for legal workers, this was obviously related to the
9amount of time spent in the U.S. since there was no signi¯cant di®erence in the average
frequency of visiting home between the legals and the illegal migrants. This is especially
interesting since the average migration cost for illegal workers is signi¯cantly higher than
legals. However, compared to the legal workers in the sample, a much bigger fraction
of undocumented workers reported having the majority of their dependents in Mexico,
which is discussed in the next section.
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Figure 4: The Location of the Majority of a Migrant's Dependents
Where the majority of the dependents of a migrant live determines the nature of social
and economic ties to either country. This variable might not only a®ect the willingness
to pay for a legal visa but of course may itself be determined by the legal status of the
migrant. Even though a slight majority of the sample (54%) reported as having most
10of their dependents living in the U.S. compared to the 46% with dependents mostly in
Mexico, the disaggregation of these ¯gures by status is more instructive.
Statistically, there was a signi¯cantly higher proportion of undocumented workers with
dependents in Mexico than documented workers. The numbers are summarized in Figure
4. This breakdown is instructive in analyzing the longer term e®ects of legalization. As
mentioned in the last section, it is interesting to note that even though this di®erence in
the location of dependents exists, there no signi¯cant di®erence between the frequency
of visits between legal and illegal workers. This may be due to a number of reasons
that can counter the e®ect of the location of dependents : i) the cost of going back and
forth for illegal workers is higher due to the cost of avoiding detection, ii) even though
the majority of the dependents of legal workers may be in the U.S., the extended family
system in Mexico's rural sending communities preserves social ties to Mexico, iii) higher
incomes5 among legal workers may produce the standard income e®ect on the number of
trips home.
3.4 Remittances to Mexico
Given the constraints of the survey construction, one may consider the frequency of the
number of trips home as an indicator of social ties to Mexico while remittances back home
can indicate economic ties. Even though we do not see a di®erence in the frequency of
visits between the two statuses in the sample, there is a clear di®erence in the amounts
remitted home per month. The statistical di®erence becomes even more signi¯cant when
we consider the proportion of monthly income sent home by the migrants. The numbers
are summarized in Figure 5. While this comparison is to the large extent dependent
on the location of dependents, it is noteworthy that the remittances by legal workers
5This is discussed in more detail in the next section.
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Figure 5: Monthly Remittances to Mexico by Status
whose dependents overwhelmingly reside in the U.S., is signi¯cantly positive. Another
interesting result regarding remittances is that even after controlling for legal status, data
show a signi¯cant and negative relationship between monthly remittances to Mexico and
years in the U.S. since the ¯rst trip, showing that such economic ties may tend to diminish
over time. Moreover, the data also show that there exists no signi¯cant income e®ect on
remittances to Mexico (and equivalently, in an alternative speci¯cation, the data show
the proportion of income sent home as remittances is negatively related to years in the
U.S.). However, this result (of an insigni¯cant income e®ect) is quite possibly due the
fact that our sample does not contain much variation in income, since it comes from
a somewhat homogenous (in terms of occupation and skill level) group of agricultural
workers. Previous studies have found a positive relationship between remittances home
and the level of skill amongst Mexican workers (Durand et al., 1996).
123.5 Perceived Wage Di®erences between Legal and Undocu-
mented Work among Mexican Migrants
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Figure 6: Perceived Wage Di®erences
The survey asked the migrants what they perceived their wage to be in the alternate
status for the same occupation given their particular characteristics. For the undocu-
mented migrants the di®erence between the perceived legal wage and their current wage
was taken as a percentage of their current wage to calculate a perceived premium to ac-
quiring legal status. For the documented migrants, the di®erence between a perceived
undocumented wage and their current legal wage was taken as a percentage of the per-
ceived undocumented wage to again estimate a perceived wage premium from legal status.
13This was motivated by three concerns:
i) Since it is ultimately the perception about wages that a®ect the perceived bene¯ts from
legal status (the possibility of which must enter the migration decision), these numbers
should be useful in analyzing the willingness to pay for legal papers.
ii) Even though the survey elicits actual wage di®erences between legal and illegal work-
ers, a true comparison (i.e. holding experience, English language pro¯ciency, skills, etc.
constant) might be elusive given lack of data on some of these migrant characteristics.
However, this exercise does show a signi¯cant di®erence between the legal and illegal wage
(the level of skill does not vary much in the sample and the years spent in the U.S. (as
a proxy for experience) is held constant, con¯rming the perceptions to some extent6. As
seen in Figure 6, an interesting ¯nding is that there appears to be a slight di®erence in
the distribution of perceptions between the legal and the undocumented workers. The
reasons can be di®erences in information content (some legal workers might have been
previously undocumented but not vice-versa) or simply due to variation caused by dif-
ferent sample sizes. Since the survey was drawn randomly from areas where documented
and undocumented workers socialized freely and worked together, it throws some doubt
on the theory of asymmetric information between two status groups.
4 Home Premium
In order to gauge if a signi¯cant non-pecuniary bene¯t to living at home as opposed to a
foreign country exists among migrants, migrants were asked about a minimum acceptable
wage they would have to make in Mexico to not migrate to the U.S. This wage was sub-
6Regression estimates put the legal wage at 44% above undocumented wage with an insigni¯cant e®ect
of years spent in the U.S.
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Figure 7: Premium Associated with Living in Mexico
tracted from the current wage a migrant made in the U.S. and the di®erence was taken
as a percentage of their U.S. wage. This variable is the \Home Premium" - it answers the
question \What percent of his or her current income would a migrant be willing to forgo
to be living in Mexico?" The results are summarized in ¯gure 7. What was interesting in
these ¯ndings was that while some attached a negative value to living in Mexico, over-
all, the Home Premium was signi¯cantly greater than zero. Another interesting though
somewhat quizzical result was that the location of the migrant's dependents was not a
signi¯cant determinant of the home premium. Probably due to this reason, the data
does not support any signi¯cant di®erence between the home premia of documented and
undocumented workers. This ¯nding supports the earlier result that even with the de-
pendents of legal workers living overwhelmingly in the U.S., the frequency of trips made
home was not statistically di®erent from that of undocumented workers. Moreover, un-
15like remittances that seem to decrease with the years spent in the U.S., like frequency
of trips home, the home premium is not a®ected by the period of time the migrant has
spent in the U.S. since his or her ¯rst visit. These preliminary results suggest that there
might strong and non diminishing social ties to Mexico, a phenomenon much bigger and
more complex than these rudimentary results can do justice to. The regression results are
displayed in Table 1. Summarizing, we only ¯nd a signi¯cant income e®ect on the home
premium, while status, location of dependents or time spent in the U.S. do not show any
signi¯cant e®ect.
Table 1: Home Premium: OLS Results
Parameter Coe® SE t-stat P > jtj
Constant -76.152 45.404 -1.68 0.098
Wage 0.673 0.126 5.36 0.000
dstatus -4.645 80.357 -0.06 0.954
ddep -5.744 34.299 -0.17 0.867
Res 0.832 3.440 0.24 0.810
R-squared 0.383
AdjR2 0.348
where the variables are de¯ned as follows: Wage is the weekly U.S. wage; dstatus is a
status dummy, with 1 = legal and 0 = undocumented; ddep is a dependent dummy, with
1 = dependents living in the U.S. and 0 = dependents living in Mexico; Res is the number
of years spent in the U.S. since the ¯rst trip across the border.
165 Willingness to Pay for Legal Visas among Undoc-
umented Workers
There is an overwhelming concentration of willingness-to-pay studies in the environmental
valuation literature which concentrate on a set of issues unique to such problems. The
question of a migrant's willingness-to-pay for legal status is being approached in this
paper not from the policy perspective typically used in WTP studies, where the valuation
is typically of a public good, real or hypothetical, provided by the government where often
a contingent valuation technique is employed to measure welfare changes. A legal work
permit is an example of a private (excludable) but non-market good being provided by the
public sector, and using the WTP valuation for this good is not very di®erent from rarer
instances where such methodology is used to value new goods or quality improvements in
an existing good being considered for market release. The di®erence here is that we are
not interested as much in the mean or median WTP which is usually a primary concern
in environmental valuation studies or which is used to determine pricing strategies for
new goods but more in the sources that a®ect the WTP for legal visas. We interpret this
WTP as the perceived bene¯t to acquiring legal status and are interested in the factors
that determine this perceived bene¯t. Equivalently, this WTP can be interpreted as an
implicit cost to being undocumented that is alleviated by acquiring legal papers and are
interested in exploring the sources of this cost.
Let us consider the migrant's utility maximization problem subject to a budget con-
straint where the migrant's legal status (U for undocumented, L for legal) is determined
by the government and is thus exogenous to the migrant. The migrant then chooses the
level of a composite market good (xm), where pm is the price of the market good and
y is the income. The consumer's utility maximization yields the Marshallian demand
17xm(pm;y;U) where U signi¯es the undocumented status of the migrant. The indirect
utility associated with this outcome is v(pm;y;U). The value that a migrant derives from
a change in status can be measured by the magnitude of WTP that ensures that the
following equality holds:
v(pm;y ¡ WTP;L) ¡ v(pm;y;U)
so that the utility from legal status after accounting for the WTP is just equal to the
utility from being undocumented at no cost.
Alternatively, we can also derive WTP from the consumer's expenditure minimization
problem holding the level of utility constant. This produces the familiar Hicksian demand
curve, xh(pm;U;U) where U is the level of utility. The indirect expenditure function
associated with this Hicksian demand is m(pm;U;U). In this case value of legal status to
an undocumented migrant can be derived from
WTP = m(pm;U;U) ¡ m(pm;U;L)
Since derived from standard economic theory, most of the contentious issues in WTP
studies arise in the discussion of methodology, especially elicitation techniques. A few
common problems are typically noted: i) Incentive incompatibility, where a respondent
may not ¯nd it optimal to reveal his or her true preference since this may a®ect how
much the respondent is ¯nally asked to pay for the good or service and ii) Hypothetical
bias, where the respondent may behave di®erently in a real situation compared to a
hypothetical scenario, or that a respondent ¯nds it hard to value a hypothetical good,
especially one that is a public good. In the case of the WTP for legal visas, these concerns
are not really relevant since a) it is clear to respondents that the possibility of a temporary
work visa program in no way depends on this survey and b) they are not being asked to
value a hypothetical public good but a private good with which they are very familiar.
18The survey is drawn from areas where legal and undocumented workers work and live
together, so it seems realistic to assume that they would have a clear idea of the bene¯ts
from acquiring legal status. The survey employed an open ended method to elicit an
exact willingness-to-pay since the usual caveats associated with this method are not very
relevant (due to the same reasons as above).
Table 2: Annual Fee for Legal Status: OLS Results
Parameter Coe® SE t-stat P > jtj
Constant -766.950 794.484 -0.97 0.342
U 161.618 52.696 3.07 0.005
Dul 28.781 11.860 2.43 0.022
Income 0.431 0.250 1.72 0.095
DUM -0.070 0.026 -2.64 0.013
Cost -0.153 0.211 -0.73 0.473
R-squared 0.442
AdjR2 0.346
where the variables are de¯ned as follows: U is the variable indicating the number
of weeks a migrant was unemployed upon arrival into the U.S.; Dul is the perceived
percentage di®erence in income between legal and undocumented workers; Income is the
yearly U.S. income; DUM is the percentage di®erence between income in U.S. and income
in Mexico prior to migration; Cost is the cost of migration.
As the results of the regression shown in Table2, the WTP for legal visas (measured
as an annual fee) is signi¯cantly and positively related to the perceived wage di®erence
between legal and undocumented workers. For a 1 percent increase in this wage di®erence,
19WTP for a legal work permit rises by 28 dollars. The second signi¯cant impact on
the WTP is the number of unemployed weeks spent in the U.S. upon migration. The
coe±cient on yearly U.S. income is positive and signi¯cant only at the 10% level. One
paradoxical result is the signi¯cant (and robust across speci¯cations) coe±cient of the
percentage di®erence between income made in the U.S. and Mexico prior to migration
which is of the wrong sign.
6 Conclusion
This paper is based on primary data collected by the authors from around the Bakers-
¯eld region in Southern California. The survey was designed to elicit not just easily
quanti¯able migrant characteristics and labor market conditions they face, but responses
on perceptions and preferences. It was administered to both legal and undocumented
Mexican agricultural workers. Some of the interesting results of the survey are: i) while
economic ties of migrants to Mexico (as measured through remittances sent home) may
diminish with years spent in the U.S., social ties (as measured by the frequency of trips
to Mexico) do not. ii) We also ¯nd that perceptions of the legal-illegal wage gap di®er
among the two status groups. The main innovation of this work is to a) empirically es-
timate the determinants of the willingness-to-pay for legal status among undocumented
workers where we ¯nd that the bene¯t of legal status to a migrant comes mainly from a
perception of higher wages in this status and through a perceived reduction in the aver-
age unemployment spell when ¯rst entering the U.S. by becoming legal and b) we also
estimate a \Home Premium", an implicit bene¯t to living in Mexico and ¯nd that even
though signi¯cantly positive, it does not di®er signi¯cantly across legal and illegal workers
or diminish with years spent in the U.S.
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